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Steven Lubet*
The Search for Analysis in Judicial
Ethics or Easy Cases Don't Make
Much Law
Most violations of judicial ethics appear to be inadvertent. Aside
from the few cases where judges deliberately violate the law or other-
wise dishonor their positions, the overwhelming majority do their best
to live within the ethical strictures that judging places upon them.
Although much needs to be done about the deliberate misbehavior,
there is little that can be said about the few bad actors.1 They must be
discovered, apprehended, and removed from the bench, but this is
more a problem of enforcement than of analysis.2
Violations persist, however, even among the well-intentioned, for a
variety of understandable reasons. First, until recently, relatively lit-
tle attention has been paid to the subject of judicial ethics. Except in
times of scandal, the subject has more or less lain dormant. The sub-
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A. 1970, Northwestern University;,
J.D. 1973, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). The research for this
work forms part of a larger project that has been supported by the Chicago Bar
Foundation and the Julius Rosenthal Fund. I am indebted to my colleague Rob-
ert Burns for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay and to Michael
Antonello for his research assistance.
In the course of this paper I will often express opinions about the state of the
general understanding of legal ethics. These impressions have been gathered
over the course of several years of lecturing at judicial conferences and counsel-
ing individual judges on the subject of judicial ethics. Although anecdotal data
must always be slightly suspect, I believe that my numerous discussions with
judges form a solid basis for understanding their concerns and beliefs, if not their
actual behavior.
1. Cases on "bad actors" fall into several categories, including: (1) actual corruption,
see, e.g., ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Haworth, 593 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1979) (judge
gave lenient treatment to convicted felon in return for felon's father's agreement
to campaign for a certain candidate for public office); (2) other law-breaking, see
e.g., In re Haggerty, 257 La. 2, 241 So.2d 469 (1970) (pattern of willful misconduct,
including illegal gambling); (3) abusive conduct toward litigants and others, see,
e.g., In re Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 386 N.E.2d 218 (1979) (abusive language on the
bench); and (4) misuse of judicial office for personal gain, Steinberg v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 51 N.Y.2d 74, 409 N.E.2d 1378, 431 N.Y.S.2d 704
(1980) (judge arranged loan transactions in his chambers).
2. See Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 983 (1985).
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ject of judicial ethics is not part of any law school curriculum,3 there is
currently no text or treatise available on the subject,4 and since 1980
the number of scholarly articles devoted to judicial ethics is probably
under a dozen.5 While judicial ethics has become an increasingly fre-
quent topic at judicial educational seminars, it is still far from being a
constant presence. For example, the American Bar Association con-
ducts seminars for appellate judges approximately three times each
year, but in the last five years, ethics topics have been on the program
only twice.
Second, many of the rules governing judicial behavior are of the
technical, "malum prohibitum" variety.6 For example, it is not inher-
ent in the job that judges must refrain from acting as fiduciaries,7 or
that a judge must decline to appear as the guest of honor at a fund-
raising event for a charity.8 Moreover, as is always the case with tech-
nical rules, interpretation becomes an exercise in fine line drawing,
3. Of course, there is no judicial equivalent to the Multi-state ethics exam that is
given to virtually every aspiring lawyer.
4. I hope to remedy this omission in the near future with the publication of a trea-
tise on judicial conduct and ethics. The book will be co-authored by Professor
Jeffrey Shaman of the De Paul University College of Law and Professor James
Alfini of the Florida State University College of Law. It will be published by
Kluwer Law Book Publishers of America.
5. A number of articles were published in the early 1970s when the Code of Judicial
Conduct was initially debated and adopted by the American Bar Association. It is
instructive to enumerate the post-1980 literature as a measure of the amount of
interest in the field. I may have missed a few, but see S. LuBET, BEYOND RE-
PROACH: ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ExTRAJUDIcIAL Acrwm=s OF STATE
AND FEDERAL JUDGES (1984); Bradbury, Judicial Morality in a Democracy, CAL.
LAw., Sept. 1985, at 10; Brooks, How Judges Get Into Trouble: Judicial Ethics and
Discipline Today, JUDGES J., Summer 1984 at 4; Gross, Judicial Speeck Disci-
pline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181 (1986); Lubet, supra
note 2; Markey, The Delicate Dichotomies of Judicial Ethics, 101 F.R.D. 373
(1984); Shaman, Off-The-Bench Conduct, 57 PA. B.A.Q. 24 (1986); Shaman &
B~gu6, Silence Isn't Always Golden. Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial
Disciplinary Process, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 755 (1985); Nathanson, The Extra-Judicial
Activities of Supreme Court Justices: Where Should The Line Be Drawn? (Book
Review), 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 494 (1983).
6. See, e.g., In re Durr, 1 Ill. Cts. Com. 13 (1973) (practice of law); In re Babineaux,
346 So.2d 676 (La. 1977) (outside business activity); In re Morrissey, 366 Mass. 11,
313 N.E.2d 878 (1974) (acceptance of gifts); In re Guay, 101 Wis. 2d 171,303 N.W.2d
669 (1981) (failure to meet financial disclosure requirements); In re Kading, 74
Wis. 2d 405, 246 N.W.2d 903 (1976) (failure to file financial disclosure reports as
required by court rule).
7. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5D (1972) ("A judge should not serve as the
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the es-
tate, trust, or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties.").
8. Id Canon 5B(2) (A judge "should not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an
organization's fund raising events, but he may attend such events."). In my own
random and completely unscientific survey of state court judges, the revelation of
this restriction is generally met with absolute consternation. The language of the
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and where fine lines will be drawn is notoriously difficult to predict.
The law is relatively well settled that a judge may allow his or her
name to appear on the letterhead of a charitable organization, but not
if the name and office are being used to solicit contributions.9 It is not
difficult to see how this distinction might elude an individual, and thus
give rise to an inadvertent violation.
Compounding the problem is the fact that most judges have no-
where to turn for advice.' 0 Although about twenty states and the Fed-
eral Judicial Conference have established "advisory" committees,"1 in
most jurisdictions advisory opinions are either unavailable or hard to
find. Even where advisory bodies exist, the scope of their authority is
often vague or the precedential value of their opinions is uncertain.'2
In any event, it appears that no state has made a practice of circulating
advisory opinions, other than upon request, or of reporting them regu-
larly in an indexed manner. In the absence of a developed mecha-
nism, such as the "Formal Opinions" of the American Bar Association,
no coherent body of interpretation has developed.13
All of this is not to say that judges themselves are without blame
regarding their general ignorance of the rules that govern their pro-
fession. Having ridden the judicial ethics circuit for several years, I
have observed that nation-wide, judges de-emphasize the importance
of ethical issues.14 The introduction of the subject is often met with
polite smiles that are clearly indicative of a prevailing "good judges
Canon is unambiguous, but judges simply cannot believe that the rule exists-or
that it applies to them.
9. Fed. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. No. 35 (May 8, 1974);
cf. Fed. Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. No. 22
(March 30, 1971) (earlier opinion, modified by Opinion No. 35, holding that a
judge's name should not be used on the letterhead of fund-raising literature).
These opinions are contained within the Code of Judicial Conduct for United
States Judges which is published by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
10. See Markey, Judicial Need for the 80's: Schooling in Judicial Ethics, 66 NEB. L.
REV. 417 (1987).
11. The advisory committee established by the Federal Judicial Conference is called
the Federal Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities.
12. See In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973) (court rejected Commis-
sion's recommendation of removal).
13. This is not to say that there are no research tools available. The Judicial Conduct
Reporter is a looseleaf service published quarterly by the Center for Judicial
Conduct Organizations. It contains summaries of recent opinions as well as short
topical articles. The American Judicature Society has published the Judicial Dis-
cipline and Disability Digest, with supplements to date. The Digest contains
short summaries of both reported opinions and unreported determinations.
14. I will not detail the states in which I have lectured on judicial ethics because I do
not want my criticisms to appear to be aimed at any particular jurisdiction. For
those who may be curious, I have taught at conferences from coast to coast and in
every region of the country. Some have been mandatory state court educational
meetings, and some have been meetings of broader groups such as the American
Judicature Society and the Conference of Judicial Conduct Organizations.
[Vol. 66:430
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don't need to listen" attitude. Moreover, this attitude extends beyond
behavior exhibited during occasional attendance at required lectures.
Of the thousand or so judges to whom I have lectured in the last two
years, it is my observation that perhaps half have not even read the
Code of Judicial Conduct. More than once I have shown the Code to a
state supreme court justice who was obviously being made aware of its
contents for the first time.
Hence, we have a problem. Judges run afoul of their Code out of
ignorance or inattention. The Code itself is often vague and policy-
oriented.15 There is no reliable interpretive literature. Although long
term solutions may be available, they offer little assistance in the
short run. Academics will probably increase the volume of their work
on judicial ethics, but undoubtedly, it will take years for even the most
practical literature to filter down to the trial court level. Advisory
bodies may be established in those states where they are now lack-
ing,16 but again there will be a time lag before the bodies are under-
stood and utilized. Even more to the point, newly established advisory
bodies will still need guidance. On what analysis will their advice be
based?
FACING THE NEED FOR ANALYSIS
To be effective, a code of ethics must ultimately be self-enforcing.
To be self-enforcing, it must be internalized. To be internalized it
must carry with it a method for application to external facts. In other
words, those who wish to follow the Code must be able to provide
their own answers to questions of interpretation. This requires analy-
sis, and, to prevent idiosyncratic interpretation, the method of analysis
must be predictable.
Ethical codes generally, and the Code of Judicial Conduct in partic-
ular, serve at least two functions. One function is legislative or statu-
tory. That is, the Code defines the crimes of the profession in such a
manner as to make them legally punishable. This function is largely
instrumental, as it does not rest strictly upon the understanding of the
Code's provisions. As shorthand, I call this the "proscriptive"
function.
The second function of the Code, which I call the "prescriptive"
function, is to set standards to guide or educate. In this manner the
Code serves not so much as a vehicle or tool, but rather as a statement
15. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, suprm note 7, Canon 2 ("A Judge Should Avoid In-
propriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities.").
16. A recent, unpublished poll of the Illinois judiciary indicated overwhelming sup-
port for the establishment of an advisory body. The results of this poll-a twelve
to one endorsement-have been forwarded to the Illinois Supreme Court, but no
action has been taken as of this writing.
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of moral order. To satisfy this purpose of the Code, understanding is
essential.
These two functions can be observed throughout the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct. Since the Code is mandatory,17 every provision is poten-
tially punitive, but some are more proscriptive than others. As a
general proposition, rules that prohibit discrete, finite or malum in se
behavior can be characterized as more proscriptive, while the more
open-textured or "attitudinal" provisions are more prescriptive in na-
ture. Thus, the requirement that judges refrain from bribe-taking or
extortion1 8 calls for less knowledge and analysis than does the com-
mand to avoid the appearance of impropriety.19 Everyone under-
stands that extortion is wrong. The relevant provision is included in
the Code not only to reinforce the common understanding but also to
serve as a legislative basis for discipline. Personal impropriety, how-
ever, is an open-textured term with no similarly shared normative
meaning.
The above distinction may also be drawn in terms of deliberate and
inadvertent conduct. Certain code violations-again consider extor-
tion or bribery-can only occur as a result of the willful conduct of the
judge. In such cases, the Code's function is to deter through punish-
ment. No amount of education or understanding will be effective,
since an evil mind is a prerequisite to the transgression. In contrast,
other violations, such as impatience or discourtesy,2 0 are usually inad-
vertent. Judges can be taught to conform their conduct. However the
distinction is denominated, the point remains that the Code covers
many sorts of conduct, and that different violations call for different
levels of juridic analysis.
Consider the Ten Commandments, an ancient code that is both
proscriptive and prescriptive. Some of its strictures, like "Thou shalt
not kill," are relatively absolute. In these cases, there is comparatively
little need for interpretation or analysis. Killing, absent legal justifi-
cation, is universally understood to be morally wrong. While analysis
is required to understand the possible exceptions or justifications, the
act or idea of killing is easily condemned.
Other Commandments, however, are less precise: "Thou shalt
honor thy mother and father." Well, yes. But how? Under what cir-
cumstances? There must be exceptions, but what are they? Do step-
parents count? As Commandments (and rules) become less absolute
and less precise, as they become more concerned with future compli-
ance and less with past acts, there develops a correspondingly greater
17. See Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 793, 796, 803 (1972).
18. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 7, Canon 2A.
19. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 7, Canon 2.
20. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 7, Canon 3A(3).
[Vol. 66:430
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need for analytic method. The Commandment against killing works
fairly well; very few people violate it in the course of their normal
lives, even in the absence of a developed literature. On the other
hand, the Commandment to honor one's parents appears not to be so
well regarded, and surely it would take an enormous campaign of pub-
lic education in order to make parental honor more commonplace.
That is, until the concept of "parental honor" becomes apparent, well-
known and predictable, it is unlikely that we will see a marked in-
crease in its observation among the young.
The same likelihoods hold true regarding rules of judicial ethics.
The rules that are relatively absolute and proscriptive tend to be fol-
lowed even in the absence of widespread knowledge or analytic under-
standing. Most judges do not steal or otherwise violate the criminal
law.2 ' When the proscriptive rules are not followed, it is frequently as
a consequence of intentional misbehavior.22 No amount of analysis or
interpretation will prevent that sort of wrongdoing, and after-the-fact
punishment is probably the only remedy. The prescriptive rules are
another matter. In order to avoid impropriety, judges must know
what the improprieties are. Short of providing an exhaustive list, the
only way to respond to this query is to provide judges with an analytic
tool.
HOW AND WHY THE COURTS HAVE FAILED
In the context of judicial ethics, the necessary, apparent, well-
known, and predictable rules can only come from the courts.
Although commentators and advisory bodies analyze issues of judicial
ethics, only the courts can speak with certainty and authority. More-
over, only the courts, through their opinions, have ready and immedi-
ate access to a wide judicial audience. Finally, judges have a tendency
to discount outside opinions as "non-binding," in an obvious reference
to the binding rulings of the higher courts.23 In any event, courts that
have occasion to rule on issues of judicial misconduct clearly have both
21. CODE OF JuDIcIAL CoNDucr, supra note 7, Canon 2A. Regarding the duty of obe-
dience to the law see Lubet, Judicial Impropriety: Love, Friendship, Free Speech,
and Other Intemperate Conduct, 1986 ARiz. ST. L.J. 379.
22. See, e.g., In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978) (judge retained court
costs of defendants in traffic cases); In re Larkin, 368 Mass. 87, 333 N.E.2d 199
(1975) (judge twice attempted to give an illegal campaign contribution to the
governor).
23. I can cite no authority for this proposition; it is strictly my observation, although
it is based upon significant contacts with judges from many jurisdictions. Inter-
estingly, I have found that trial judges are the least likely to be interested in
academic opinions, while judges who sit on higher courts are more open. Perhaps
this is because reviewing judges are less concerned with reversal and conse-
quently worry less about conflicts between academic opinions and those of the
higher courts.
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the opportunity and the duty to set forth standards and analysis to
guide their fellow judges.
Unfortunately, many courts appear to view misconduct cases only
as distasteful obligations, and not as opportunities for helpful explica-
tion. This often leads to a disproportionate preoccupation with the
facts of the case at hand, and a corresponding lack of emphasis on pol-
icy questions and legal principles. Judges who read such opinions are
left, at best, with an understanding of a single sort of proscribed con-
duct, but without a guide for the evaluation of future behavior.
For example, a recurring problem in judicial discipline is the ques-
tion of whether a judge can be sanctioned for conduct that is legal
where committed but illegal in the judge's home state. The Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that judges must obey the law24 and avoid
even the appearance of impropriety, 25 but it does not explain the rela-
tionship, if any, among law, propriety, and geographic jurisdiction.
Thus, with regard to such jurisdictionally diverse issues as gambling
and consensual sexual conduct, judges are left in the classic prescrip-
tive quandary. What does the Code require of the well-meaning
judge?2 6
Two courts that have had occasion to consider this issue have given
us little in the way of useful methodology. In In re DeSaulnier,27 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered numerous disci-
plinary charges against a judge, including the complaint that he had
gone on gambling junkets to Las Vegas in the company of a Massachu-
setts bail bondsman.28 Although the printed opinion and appendix
contain over twenty pages of facts, only a single sentence is devoted to
explanation of the gambling charge: "Furthermore, public gambling
and being a judge are completely incompatible." 29
While it is true that the gambling charge was the least of Judge
DeSaulnier's transgressions,3 0 the court's offhand treatment of the is-
sue created more analytical problems than it solved. Why is public
gambling incompatible with being a judge? Is it only casino gambling
that must be avoided, or is pari-mutuel betting also off-limits? Did the
company of the bondsman make the gambling worse, or would it have
been just as bad without him? Does the rule hold true only in the
United States, or would it apply to Monte Carlo as well? Would it
24. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 7, Canon 2A ("A judge should respect
and comply with the law...").
25. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 7, Canon 2 ("A Judge Should Avoid Im-
propriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities.").
26. See Lubet, supra note 21.
27. 360 Mass. 787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972).
28. Id at 806, 279 N.E.2d at 306-07.
29. Id at 812, 279 N.E.2d at 310.
30. The judge was also charged with influencing the disposition of cases and various
financial improprieties. I&. at 812-13, 279 N.E.2d at 310.
[Vol. 66:430
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apply to gambling on a cruise ship in non-territorial waters? In short,
what is it about legal gambling that might lead to judicial discipline,
and how should judges evaluate their conduct in the future?
In In re Tschirhart,31 the Michigan Supreme Court considered
charges against a judge who, in the course of visiting a legal Nevada
brothel, had become involved in an altercation with a taxi driver.
Upon his return to Michigan, the judge gave a series of newspaper
interviews about the incident that were considered "defiant, flippant,
and disparaging."3 2 The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the deci-
sion of the state Judicial Tenure Commission and censured the judge
for his coarse remarks, without consideration of his participation in
the act of prostitution.33 The court made no reference at all to the
concurring opinion of one commissioner, who stated: "The fact that
brothels are legal in the state of Nevada does not permit a Michigan
judge outside his jurisdiction to participate.... A visit of a Michigan
judge to a Nevada brothel is judicial misconduct for a Michigan
judge." 34
In both cases the courts declined to reach questions that were not
necessary to their decisions. It was certain that Judges DeSaulnier
and Tschirhart were going to be disciplined, without regard to their
out-of-state conduct, and those issues were consequently relegated to
dicta or less. While this approach is generally a sound adjudicative
principle,3 5 it leaves much to be desired when discussing judicial
discipline.
In the typical case, courts are primarily interested in reaching a
decision; once the matter is resolved, the discussion of additional is-
sues would be speculative and would do nothing to advance the inter-
ests of either party. Regarding judicial discipline, however, courts of
review have an additional responsibility to set or articulate standards
for the lower courts. This responsibility may be constitutional, as in
Illinois,36 or statutory as in the federal system.37 In any event, and
even in the absence of specific statutory or constitutional text, the su-
perior position and greater visibility of the higher courts create both
an opportunity and duty to exercise a teaching and guidance function
31. 422 Mich. 1207, 371 N.W.2d 850 (1985).
32. Id. at 1210, 371 N.W.2d at 852.
33. Id. at 1207, 371 N.W.2d 850.
34. Id. at 1212, 371 N.W.2d at 853.
35. As is well known, the United States Supreme Court will generally decline to ad-
dress constitutional questions when they are not necessary to reach a decision on
the merits. International Ass'n of Machinist v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750 (1961).
36. The Illinois Supreme Court has the constitutional duty to "supervise" the entire
state court system. People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 445,
372 N.E.2d 53 (1977).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1982).
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regarding judicial behavior.38
It is not unheard of for higher courts to enhance their decisions by
articulating prescriptive rules, particularly where institutional issues
are involved. In the area of law enforcement, for example, it may be
necessary for opinions to do more than resolve a particular conflict.
The most famous instance of judicially drawn guidelines is no doubt
the Miranda decision,3 9 where the United States Supreme Court set
forth rules to be followed thereafter by every police officer in the
country.4 0 The articulation of the Miranda warnings was not essential
to the resolution of the case; Miranda's confession could have been
ruled inadmissible without the establishment of a sweeping rule. The
point is that the Court resolved a widespread problem by laying down
requirements for future conduct.
The United States Supreme Court is, of course, primarily a consti-
tutional tribunal; the very breadth of its responsibility explains the
policy-making nature of many of the Court's decisions. It goes without
saying that other courts do not possess as wide a warrant as the
Supreme Court, but state supreme courts, or "courts on the judiciary"
where they exist,41 do exercise a comparable function with regard to
overseeing the activities of the judges within their jurisdiction or scope
of supervision.
EASY CASES DON'T MAKE MUCH LAW
Why, then, do so many judicial opinions fail to provide the neces-
sary level of guidance? One reason is surely that once cases of judicial
misconduct are presented to a reviewing court, they tend to be simple.
By the time that a case of judicial misconduct reaches a reviewing
court it typically has been subjected to substantial filtering. Every
state has a judicial conduct organization whose duty it is to review and
evaluate complaints. The effective functioning of these bodies leads to
a variety of results, all of which tend to limit the "data" from which
appellate courts may shape their opinions regarding judicial conduct.
First, the conduct organizations handle the time-consuming obliga-
tion of investigating and rejecting frivolous and other non-meritorious
complaints. These decisions are not reported, and indeed are often
kept confidential.42 Unlike the ordinary legal process, no individual is
entitled to pursue a complaint for judicial misconduct, and as a general
rule, no appeal is available when a complaint is terminated at the in-
vestigatory stage.43 Consequently, the opportunity for a jurisprudence
38. See United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
39. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. Id at 444.
41. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 28 (1980); Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 51 (rescinded July 1, 1971).
42. Shaman & B6gu6, supra note 5, at 756.
43. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 753e(6) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (contains no provision for
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to develop is substantially limited by the winnowing process.44
It is true that judges' time need not be overly consumed in the de-
fense of frivolous complaints, but there is an associated cost. In an
ordinary civil case an aggrieved party generally may pursue even a
meritless claim at least through a first appeal.45 As vexing as this may
be in many cases, it does give appellate courts the opportunity to ex-
pound upon the nature of the various causes of action. In the area of
judicial discipline, a court could perform its teaching function just as
well in the course of dismissing a bad complaint as it could in uphold-
ing a good one.
Moreover, the exclusion of frivolous complaints from the formal
judicial system must necessarily-if only by reason of probability-
also exclude some number of valid but novel complaints as well.
Again, this is probably an acceptable price to pay for the protection of
so fragile an institution as the judiciary, but the result is that we do
not see the law of judicial ethics developing in the same dynamic fash-
ion as do many other doctrinal areas.
In the case of non-frivolous complaints, most judicial conduct bod-
ies have available a wide range of relatively mild remedies that can be
employed in less serious cases. Thus, private reprimands or short sus-
pensions may be agreed to by judges, either out of contrition or in an
effort to avoid bad publicity. These cases, of course, will never come
before a court, and so, for very good reasons, another set of opportuni-
ties to develop the law of judicial ethics is lost.
Finally, we come to the cases that do reach the reviewing courts.
As a consequence of the screening process, these cases, almost by defi-
nition, will be meritorious as a matter of law and relatively serious as a
matter of fact. In a word, they tend to be easy.
One feature that frequently makes disciplinary cases easy is the
any appeal proceedings; however, note that an administrator may petition the
court for leave to file exceptions within 21 days after service of the order termi-
nating action); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-721 (1985) (contains no provision for any ap-
peal proceeding when the action is terminated).
44. In 1985 a total of 4782 complaints against judges were disposed of in the 50 states
and the District of Columbia. Of these, 4113 were simply dismissed after investi-
gation or an initial screening, and an additional 507 were resolved privately or
informally. Only 61 cases, slightly more than 1.5%, were the subject of public
disposition. See "Center Surveys JCO Complaint Disposition, Budget and Staff
for 1985," Vol. 8, No. 4 Judicial Conduct Reporter 1, 3 (Winter 1987).
45. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 301, 303, 602, 604 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
But see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (which states that an attorney's signature on a pleading
or motion is a warrant by him that it "is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.. ."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(2) (1986) (which states that when representing a client, a lawyer shall not
"[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law
1987]
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presence of numerous or repeated acts of misconduct. As we saw ear-
lier in In re DeSaulinier,46 it is not unheard of for the mere recitation
of charges against a judge to run over a dozen pages. The specific
charges against Judge DeSaulinier included conspiring to influence
pending cases, seeking wrongful reimbursement of expenses, practic-
ing law, holding a broker's license, serving as a bank director, associat-
ing with and borrowing money from a bail bondsman whom the judge
also supervised, and public gambling.47
Other examples abound. In In re Lawrence,48 the judge was ac-
cused of assigning cases to attorneys with whom he had financial ties,
holding an interest in a liquor license, accepting free representation
from an attorney, making misrepresentations to the county board and
improperly retaining campaign funds.49 Similarly, in In re Yac-
carino,50 the judge was charged with misconduct in eight separate
cases, including threatening and demeaning witnesses, commenting in
open court on his own financial dealings, invoking personal and reli-
gious beliefs not legally relevant to the case, using crude language
from the bench, directing offensive and harsh remarks to counsel, hu-
miliating litigants, using the power and authority of his office in an
attempt to influence other public officials, owning an interest in two
liquor licensees, and developing a personal interest in the subject mat-
ter of a proceeding before him.51
Why is it a problem that the cases are so easy? How much energy
or analysis needs to be expended in disciplining a judge whose miscon-
duct requires thirty-two pages merely to recite?52 Were we dealing
exclusively with intentional wrongdoing, of course there would be no
problem-egregious and repeated misconduct would simply be pun-
ished and the proscriptive aspect of judicial ethics would be well
served. The difficulty is that most cases, as in the illustrations above,
46. 360 Mass. 787, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972).
47. Id at 808-14, 279 N.E.2d at 308-11.
48. 417 Mich. 248, 335 N.W.2d 456 (1983).
49. Id. at 251-52, 335 N.W.2d at 457.
50. 101 N.J. 342, 502 A.2d 3 (1985).
51. Id. at 354-73, 502 A.2d at 9-19. See also In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203
(1973) (lying under oath, using pressure to gain a political contribution, filing a
false statement, neglecting judicial duties, misusing the services of a court em-
ployee, and obtaining free legal services from lawyers); In re Carillo, 542 S.W.2d
105 (Tex. 1976) (obtaining goods in exchange for welfare payments, failure to re-
cuse, assisting in the unlawful receipt of county funds, using county employees
and equipment on his own property, and six instances of misappropriating county
funds); In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980) (acceptance of
favorable automobile rentals, failure to report gifts, five separate incidents of
"unprivileged and nonconsensual physical contacts with offensive sexual over-
tones," and four separate incidents of commenting on the merits of pending
proceedings).
52. See In re Yaccarino, 101 N.J. at 354-86, 502 A.2d at 9-26.
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involve a mixture of intentional and unintentional violations.5 3 The
result is that the unintentional violations tend to get lost in the shuf-
fle, as does the opportunity for prescriptive explication.
In Yaccarino,m for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that the respondent judge had exploited his position by attempting to
purchase a parcel of real estate that was the subject of a proceeding
over which he was presiding. Moreover, the judge "attempted to con-
ceal his wrongdoing by a pattern of conduct that at the very least
could lead a knowledgeable individual to believe that there was an at-
tempt to have persons suborn perjury and to have evidence of wrong-
doing destroyed."55 Once the facts were determined, this
transgression represented the classic "easy case" for the appropriate-
ness of discipline. Indeed, the court itself referred to this conduct as
touching "directly upon the administration of justice and the integrity
of the judicial process." 56
On the other hand, the Yaccarino case also involved a finding that
the judge had on several occasions demeaned witnesses, insulted attor-
neys, and injected his own personal views into his adjudications.
These offenses, as they aggregated, were discussed strictly in the con-
text of factual determinations. The offending conduct was either re-
cited or summarized, and from that the court concluded that Judge
Yaccarino had violated the applicable Canons.5 7
53. In this context the term "unintentional" may be somewhat too strong. Most of
the less culpable conduct, such as injecting one's irrelevant personal beliefs into
the adjudication, was consciously undertaken. In most cases, however, it should
be obvious that the judge was acting in good faith with no wrongful purpose.
Thus, violations, such as misappropriation of funds, evidence not only specific in-
tent but moral culpability as well. On the other hand, violations of the intemper-
ate or "poor judgment" sort--berating witnesses, failure to recuse, or insulting
counsel-may fall under the standard definition of intent but are not otherwise
indicative of an intention to violate the standards to which judges are held.
54. 101 N.J. 342, 502 A.2d 3 (1985). I use this case as an illustration primarily because
the opinion is both recent and extensive. Many other cases, from many other
states, might serve as well. Moreover, given the length and factual complexity of
the Yaccarino matter, it is not my intention to fault the New Jersey Supreme
Court simply because they did not increase the length of their opinion by discuss-
ing the issues that I have raised above. Indeed, the court obviously went to great
lengths to do justice in the individual case. Still, my broader point holds; the
prescriptive function was not served as it might have been.
55. Id. at 386, 502 A.2d at 26.
56. Id. at 373, 502 A.2d at 19.
57. Regarding the judge's demonstration of bias and hostility toward a witness, for
example, the court stated:
Based upon our independent assessment of the record, the evidence
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that, in their totality, re-
pondent's comments in this matter were such that he threatened the de-
fendant and expressed a personal bias and hostility against him that was
wholly inconsistent with the judicial obligation to remain objective and
neutral. This evidence also demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt
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It is obvious that as a proscriptive matter the charge of exploiting
the judicial office for financial gain is far more serious than is the
problem of occasionally insulting witnesses. The New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized this by referring to the financial self-deal-
ing charge as its "most critical focus." 58 It does not follow, however,
that the same priority holds with regard to the prescriptive aspect of
judicial ethics.
One of the apparently minor charges against Judge Yaccarino was
that he had, in a particular case, allowed his personal beliefs to intrude
upon his decision-making. The court found that in presiding over a
child custody matter, the judge had "indicated that his personal views
concerning religion took precedence over the law."5 9 Specifically, the
judge invoked religious reasons for his rulings several times and told
the children's mother "that she had 'an absolute affirmative duty cast
upon [her] by [her] God' "60 to persuade the children to respect and
revere their father. He also injected his personal views on divorce,
stating that "he himself was 'uncivilized' since 'I don't believe in di-
vorce.' "61 It is obvious that the judge was ruling in good faith and
meant no harm, and the court recognized as much.62 Nonetheless,
based upon these and similar remarks, the court found that Judge
Yaccarino "invoked personal beliefs not legally relevant to the case,
and made irresponsible and reckless statements showing disrespect
for and defiance of the law."63
These findings and the conclusion that the judge violated the Code
of Judicial Conduct present enormously important and difficult pre-
scriptive questions. To what extent may a judge, acting in good faith,
allow his or her religious views to influence judicial decisions? Is it
permissible to invoke a party's religion in order to seek compliance
with court orders? May any personal references be made at all? At
what point does loose talk become irresponsible and reckless? At
what point does it violate the Canons?
that respondent's conduct of this case reflected discourtesy, disrespect,
and impatience, clearly constituting improper decorum and a lack of dig-
nity, which vitiated the atmosphere of fairness and impartiality. Based
upon these findings, we conclude that respondent violated Canons 1, 2A,
3A(3) and 3A(4).
Id at 354-55, 502 A.2d at 9-10. This passage, with relevant alterations for factual
and legal differences, was repeated at the end of the court's consideration of each
of the judge's "demeanor" offenses.
58. Id at 373, 502 A.2d at 19.
59. Id- at 356, 502 A.2d at 10.
60. Id
61. Id
62. "The respondent made extraordinary efforts to reconcile the father and his chil-
dren. The judge struggled to assure each party that he understood that party's
position." Id at 357, 502 A.2d at 10-11.
63. Id at 357, 502 A.2d at 11.
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These are questions that surely must trouble many judges. Once it
is recognized that this sort of casual commentary may lead to disci-
pline, the need for analytic guidance becomes acute. After all, judges
regularly invoke God when exhorting witnesses to tell the truth. Why
does it become unethical to utilize the same device when seeking to
enforce visitation?
My point is that this sort of violation is obviously inadvertent. The
judge was not trying to take advantage of his office or commit any
other wrongful act. Nevertheless, he violated the Code. If other
judges in the future are to avoid similar pitfalls, then they must have
more in the way of prescription than a simple description of the facts
and citation to the Canons.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not go further because that
was unnecessary in order to reach its decision. Judge Yaccarino
wasn't rude only once, but numerous times. He didn't merely mention
religion, he used it as a rationale for disregarding the law. Moreover,
his other, clearly intentional conduct was of itself sufficient to warrant
discipline. Viewed strictly in decisional terms, opinions like this are
more than adequate. As a guide to future conduct, however, they are
maddeningly unsatisfying.
WHERE TO GO, WHAT TO DO
This paper has focused upon the need for analysis in judicial opin-
ions that deal with questions of judicial ethics, but I do not necessarily
mean the same sort of analysis that will eventually come from aca-
demics. There is surely a need to understand judicial ethics in terms
of moral philosophy, just as that discipline has been brought to bear on
the subject of legal ethics generally.64 While it would no doubt be en-
lightening, it is not necessary that judges embrace the debate between
deontological and teleological views of professional role differentia-
tion. Nor is it necessary for opinions to strive to establish an economic
model for recusal. Judges may begin with a more modest approach.
Let me suggest as a minimum level of explication for opinions on
judicial ethics that consideration of each charge or violation ought to
include discussion of policy, goals, means, costs and solutions. These
are ideas that are easily understood and require no complex exegeses.
Such analysis may not provide perfect guidance in every case, but it
will explain the purpose of the court's ruling and the means by which
64. See, eg., THE GOOD LAwYER LAWYERs' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETnHcs (D. Luban
ed. 1983); D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J.
761 (1983); Burns, A Lawyer's Truth. Notes for a Moral Philosophy of Litigation
Practice, 3 J.L. & RELIG. 229 (1985); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Rhode, Eth.
ical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589 (1985).
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the court intends to achieve that purpose in the future. Even in easy
cases, that would be a substantial achievement.
